KC-46A Program Back in the News

Nothing surprises me any more about this continuing debacle. Thanks for the update, H2H.

For comparison, see:  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Airbus_A330_MRTT

See also : https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104530 

GAO-22-104530 Published: Jan 27, 2022. Publicly Released: Jan 27, 2022.“KC-46 Tanker:Air Force Needs to Mature Critical Technologies in New Aerial Refueling System Design”

According to the GAO report:

Quote

In February 2011, the Air Force awarded a contract to Boeing to modify the design of a commercial aircraft—the Boeing 767—into a military aerial refueling tanker, the KC-46. However, several critical deficiencies with the refueling system have delayed the completion of the development portion of this program. Critical deficiencies are shortfalls that could cause death, severe injury, or illness, or otherwise cause loss or damage to the aircraft. Under the original contract, Boeing was required to deliver 18 KC-46 tankers in the final production configuration by August 2017, but these critical deficiencies have prevented Boeing from doing so, which has limited the KC-46’s refueling capacity to date. Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 generally prohibited the Air Force from retiring any additional KC-135s and required the Air Force to maintain at least 26 KC-10s through fiscal year 2023. Furthermore, the Air Force is evaluating the viability of a contracted aerial refueling program to supplement the Air Force’s tanker fleet by supporting training missions. The Navy has been using contracted aerial refueling services to support its training needs for about 20 years.

*     *     *

In October 2021, Air Force officials said they plan to assume financial responsibility for the new RVS design without ensuring the program takes key steps to mature the system’s critical technologies. In April 2020, at least 2 years after the identification of the critical deficiencies, the Air Force and Boeing signed a memorandum of agreement that settled the path forward to design a new RVS. However, it also stipulated the Air Force would be financially responsible for any further design changes to the RVS after completing the preliminary design review for the system. According to DOD guidance, the preliminary design review ensures that there is technical confidence that the capability need can be satisfied within cost and schedule goals and that risks have been identified and mitigation plans established. This arrangement, effectively, reversed the original terms of the firm-fixed price contract that aimed to hold Boeing fully responsible for delivering a system that would work in any lighting conditions.

Boeing won the fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract in 2011 after a FAR Part 15 source selection, in which the competitors submitted detailed technical proposals that described their proposed "approach" to design and development. They won it after winning a protest against award to Northrop Grumman and Airbus.

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-991t.pdf

https://www.gao.gov/assets/b-311344%2Cb-311344.10%2Cb-311344.11%2Cb-311344.3%2Cb-311344.4%2Cb-311344..pdf

https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/business/25tanker.html#:~:text=In a surprise twist to,company that builds Airbus planes.

Boeing won a follow-on contract last year. https://www.flightglobal.com/fixed-wing/boeing-wins-21bn-for-15-more-kc-46a-tankers-points-to-battle-communications-role/142077.article#:~:text=Boeing has won its second,Boeing says on 21 January.

I hope this result shows people that (1) "technical proposals" that describe a distant, imagined future are not, and never have been, reliable bases for contractor selection and contract formation, and that (2) gimmicky contractual incentive devices simply do not work and never have.

But it won't show people. I guess nothing ever will.

Vern Edwards said:

I hope this result shows people that (1) "technical proposals" that describe a distant, imagined future are not, and never have been, reliable bases for contractor selection and contract formation, and that (2) gimmicky contractual incentive devices simply do not work and never have.

But it won't show people. I guess nothing ever will.

This story shows me that Boeing's people were the smartest people in the room, despite what DoD and USAF leadership said at the time about their team(s).

Boeing's strategy of "investing" in new programs by intentionally submitting a price that it knows is less than the expected cost of performance, and then riding out the initial losses--expecting to make its investment back plus a return on that investment in the long-term, continues to work for the company. The company apparently has outstanding financial strategists.

Kudos to them.

here_2_help said:

Boeing's strategy of "investing" in new programs by intentionally submitting a price that it knows is less than the expected cost of performance, and then riding out the initial losses--expecting to make its investment back plus a return on that investment in the long-term, continues to work for the company.

Sounds like buying-in when put this way, but what is ‘artificially high’? 🤔

Vern Edwards said:

I hope this result shows people that (1) "technical proposals" that describe a distant, imagined future are not, and never have been, reliable bases for contractor selection and contract formation, and that (2) gimmicky contractual incentive devices simply do not work and never have.

But it won't show people. I guess nothing ever will.

Why not add in a bogus RFP requirement from 1973.  From the RFP.

Quote

Each proposer was required to submit a proposal encompassing the entire SRM project for three increments.  Cost proposals were requested for Increments 1 and 2 which covered all efforts required for the total design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E) of the SRM, including six development flights, and all efforts necessary to manufacture, test, and deliver new and refurbished SRM's for 54 flights (108 SRM's)  Increment 3 cost estimates were to comprise all efforts necessary to manufacture, test, and deliver new and refurbished SRM's for 385 flights (770 SRM's).

Add the 12, 108, and 770 together and you have 890 solid rocket motors for 444 Space Shuttle flights over the Shuttles planned 11 years.  

From 1981 through 2011 there were 135 Space Shuttle flights that required 270 solid rocket motors.  I'll stop here

Jamaal Valentine said:

Sounds like buying-in when put this way, but what is ‘artificially high’? 🤔

It's not buying-in when there is no intention of getting well through change orders. Instead, the company (obviously) plans to recoup its initial losses through follow-on work. It's a great strategy and it destroys most competitors, because only the very biggest contractors can absorb the initial losses.

here_2_help said:

This story shows me that Boeing's people were the smartest people in the room, despite what DoD and USAF leadership said at the time about their team(s).

Boeing's strategy of "investing" in new programs by intentionally submitting a price that it knows is less than the expected cost of performance, and then riding out the initial losses--expecting to make its investment back plus a return on that investment in the long-term, continues to work for the company. The company apparently has outstanding financial strategists.

Kudos to them.

Does it work for Boeing though? KC-46, 737-MAX, 787 Dreamliner...each plagued programs that are not deserving of kudos...

And if you want to default to financial performance as the standard (versus delivering good product) consider the following: Starting in Feb 2011 with the KC-46 award Boeing was valued at $72.30 and today is valued at $206.79 (a 186% percent increase) whereas Airbus was valued at $7.13 in Feb 2011 and is valued today at $32.07 (a 350% increase). Compared to it's chief competitor in the defense marketplace, Lockheed Martin, they still lag (Lockheed experienced a 373% increase over that same period, from $81.81 to $387.15)...Boeing has even lagged the market as the S&P 500 experienced a 249% increase over that same period.

Just because one party got something wrong, doesn't mean the other party got it right - I hope for all our sakes we do learn from the KC-46 source selection and do better as we acquire the next tanker.

The re-competition after the Boeing protest resulted in the DoD switching from BV Tradeoff to essentially LPTA, which was a setup for Boeing, with its smaller plane.

The DoD/USAF announced to the media and general public that the re-competition would be a “fixed price” contract. The TV media apparently didn’t either know or understand that it was actually a “fixed price incentive” award for the first part of the program. Not publicized was that the government’s cost share between the target price and ceiling price ended up being 60% of the overrun - over $500 million dollars.

Edit:  Apparently, the cost growth is more than 100% of the original 2011 award…

”Boeing on Jan. 27 [2021] reported another $275 million charge to its KC-46 program, pushing the total cost overruns it is responsible for to more than $5 billion in the past six years—more than the initial contract award for the tanker.”  Source: https://www.airforcemag.com/boeings-kc-46-cost-overruns-surpass-5-billion/

In 1926, Congress enacted the Air Corps Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 780. The Act created the Army Air Corps and authorized the Army and Navy to buy aircraft through the use of design competitions instead of sealed bidding. The story of that development is told in Holley, Jr., Unites States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces (U.S. Army, 1964).

Here is how the author describes the military services' experience with design competitions, on pages 113-114.:

Quote

In practice the idea of design competition proved unworkable, for it yielded nothing more tangible than a paper promise to perform. When circular proposals went out inviting bids on a certain type of aircraft [i.e., RFPs], a whole flood of replies returned to Wright Field [now Wright-Patterson AFB]. Inexperienced designers were more than willing to dream up aircraft alleged to possess the most superlative flying qualities and performance capabilities—as yet unattained. Until a physical sample or experimental airplane could be built around the winning design there was no telling whether the evaluation board had picked a leader or a lemon. If the chanced to choose a lemon, a great deal of money and time had to be spent before the error could be confirmed.

And on pages 139-140:

Quote

After three failures in 1926 and 1927, procurement officers had avoided the use of design competitions until driven to try four more during 1935. Two others in modified form were tried during 1938. Significantly, none of the aircraft used in World War II had its inception in a design competition. In 1935 Air Corps procurement officers once again reached the conclusion of 1927: paper promises to perform were meaningless. The design competition was unworkable.

Peck and Scherer, in The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis (Harvard, 1962), p. 364, the authors say:

Quote

In sum, uncertainty at the design competition stage in a advanced development program is reflected in the difficulty of predicting technical performance values and in subsequent design changes. As we shall see later, this uncertainty problem has often been aggravated by under contractor optimism in design competition proposals. As a result, the design competition has been termed "a competition in optimism and exaggeration" and design proposals have been called "science fiction."

The same could be said for IT program proposals. The same could be said of almost all technical proposal/soundness of approach competitions.

Vern Edwards said:

In 1926, Congress enacted the Air Corps Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 780. The Act created the Army Air Corps and authorized the Army and Navy to buy aircraft through the use of design competitions instead of sealed bidding. The story of that development is told in Holley, Jr., Unites States Army in World War II, Special Studies, Buying Aircraft: Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces (U.S. Army, 1964).

Thanks for sharing this reading recommendation Vern. I found a free download here for anyone else interested in reading it. Based on those excerpts you provided I look forward to it.

I just finished reading the book "Stealth" by Peter Westwick and I can't help but juxtapose the processes used for developing and fielding stealth aircraft to how many approach acquisitions today. I understand the exponential reduction of the radar cross section of an aircraft is a considerably different technological feat than placing a camera on a boom but, to me, that's the point - would it really have cost us that much in time and money to test the remote vision system concept before commiting the future of the tanker fleet to it?

here_2_help said:

It's not buying-in when there is no intention of getting well through change orders.

Buying-in is a disjunctive rule that also includes expecting to “[r]eceive follow-on contracts at artificially high prices to recover losses incurred on the buy-in contract.” It’s not limited to change orders.

Again, I’m just saying it ‘sounds like’ buying-in. I’m not making an assertion that it actually is buying-in.

Matthew Fleharty said:

Does it work for Boeing though? KC-46, 737-MAX, 787 Dreamliner...each plagued programs that are not deserving of kudos...

And if you want to default to financial performance as the standard (versus delivering good product) consider the following: Starting in Feb 2011 with the KC-46 award Boeing was valued at $72.30 and today is valued at $206.79 (a 186% percent increase) whereas Airbus was valued at $7.13 in Feb 2011 and is valued today at $32.07 (a 350% increase). Compared to it's chief competitor in the defense marketplace, Lockheed Martin, they still lag (Lockheed experienced a 373% increase over that same period, from $81.81 to $387.15)...Boeing has even lagged the market as the S&P 500 experienced a 249% increase over that same period.

Just because one party got something wrong, doesn't mean the other party got it right - I hope for all our sakes we do learn from the KC-46 source selection and do better as we acquire the next tanker.

Stop your timelines just before the 737-MAX tragedy/debacle/fiasco and rerun your numbers. I think you'll reach a different conclusion.

here_2_help said:

Stop your timelines just before the 737-MAX tragedy/debacle/fiasco and rerun your numbers. I think you'll reach a different conclusion.

Why do that when the same focus on the financials strategy is a root cause of the 737 MAX?

Matthew Fleharty said:

Why do that when the same focus on the financials strategy is a root cause of the 737 MAX?

You're making an assumption based on ... something.

Look, I don't want to argue with you. I'll assert that you don't understand Boeing, especially the interplay between its commercial division and its government division. Let's just leave it at that.

here_2_help said:

You're making an assumption based on ... something.

Look, I don't want to argue with you. I'll assert that you don't understand Boeing, especially the interplay between its commercial division and its government division. Let's just leave it at that.

If you don't want to argue the issue why make an assertion directed at me and then state to just leave it at that?

Besides, if you re-read my post, my primary exception to your issuance of kudos wasn't the financial performance, but the problems with the program(s) themselves...why laud efforts like the KC-46 when it's been behind schedule and consistently failed to deliver on its performance? I'll assert that you don't understand the bigger picture. Shall we just leave it at that?

@here_2_help @Matthew Fleharty

Read Air Wars: The Global Combat Between Airbus and Boeing (2021), by Scott Hamilton.

H2H, what doesn't Matthew understand about the interplay between Boeing's commercial division and its government division? I'd like to know if I understand.

here_2_help said:

You're making an assumption based on ... something.

Look, I don't want to argue with you. I'll assert that you don't understand Boeing, especially the interplay between its commercial division and its government division. Let's just leave it at that.

I ordered the book: Flying Blind The 737 MAX Tragedy and the Fall of Boeing   by Peter Robison · 2021 for my son-in-law.

There is an excellent overview of Boeing and a 37 page preview of the contents of the book at:

https://books.google.com/books/about/Flying_Blind.html?id=T88LEAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&newbks=1&newbks_redir=0&source=gb_mobile_entity

The book also discusses the History of Boeing and some of its competitors, including McDonnell Douglas. I recommend at least reading both the (expanded) overview and the preview of the book.

(I will read the book when I visit them ASAP.  He is a retired Air Force McDonnell Douglas (now Boeing) C-17 pilot and current United Airlines B-737 and B-737 Max 9 pilot before the grounding and now again.  I haven’t had an opportunity to discuss his current views of the Max 9 with him. He thought it was simply a pilot error problem back at the time it happened.)

Vern Edwards said:

@here_2_help @Matthew Fleharty

Read Air Wars: The Global Combat Between Airbus and Boeing (2021), by Scott Hamilton.

H2H, what doesn't Matthew understand about the interplay between Boeing's commercial division and its government division? I'd like to know if I understand.

I'm pretty sure, having spoken with company employees, that the commercial division is supposed to generate robust cash flows through commercial margins to be used by the government division to invest in R&D and new program awards.

I like this USNI article from a couple of years ago. It doesn't address my assertion (above) but it does speak to Boeing's strategy, which was working just great before the 737-MAX debacle.

here_2_help said:

I'm pretty sure, having spoken with company employees, that the commercial division is supposed to generate robust cash flows through commercial margins to be used by the government division to invest in R&D and new program awards.

I like this USNI article from a couple of years ago. It doesn't address my assertion (above) but it does speak to Boeing's strategy, which was working just great before the 737-MAX debacle.

H2H, You might change your mind after reading only the expanded overview and first 37 pages of the book that I referenced above.  I can’t quote from the book but it won’t take a tremendous amount of time to get a glimpse of some of the problems - many stemming from the late 1990’s merger  with McDonnell Douglas.

here_2_help said:

I like this USNI article from a couple of years ago. It doesn't address my assertion (above) but it does speak to Boeing's strategy, which was working just great before the 737-MAX debacle.

@here_2_helpHave you read Flying Blind? I don't think the 737-MAX was the beginning of Boeing's troubles. It seems to have been the result. The troubles seem to have started with the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas.

But what do I know?

Vern Edwards said:

@here_2_helpHave you read Flying Blind? I don't think the 737-MAX was the beginning of Boeing's troubles. It seems to have been the result. The troubles seem to have started with the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas.

But what do I know?

Nope. And you know a lot.

Somehow we've gotten away from my original assertion, which was that Boeing's LPTA "investment" strategy was brilliant and resulted in a number of key program wins--not only KC-46 but also MQ-25. I have no opinion on their engineering acumen, or lack thereof.

here_2_help said:

Nope. And you know a lot.

Somehow we've gotten away from my original assertion, which was that Boeing's LPTA "investment" strategy was brilliant and resulted in a number of key program wins--not only KC-46 but also MQ-25. I have no opinion on their engineering acumen, or lack thereof.

Even if you don’t read the book, I highly recommend that you at least read the overview and preview of the book. It outlines and explains the author’s view of how the BUSINESS decisions and “win at all costs” management policies of Company leadership and “hordes of cutthroat managers” (brought in after the MD merger in 1997) often overrode the engineering and production side of the business. “Brilliant”? That is debatable.

here_2_help said:

Nope. And you know a lot.

Somehow we've gotten away from my original assertion, which was that Boeing's LPTA "investment" strategy was brilliant and resulted in a number of key program wins--not only KC-46 but also MQ-25. I have no opinion on their engineering acumen, or lack thereof.

Yes,   Boeings LPTA lowball strategy to lock in the USAF for the follow on Tanker production orders may look brilliant. That may be a combination of the Boeing strategy, short sighted “limitations “ of the DoD and USAF and concerted political pressures. However, Boeing’s “less than stellar” (putting it mildly) cost, schedule, and quality performance might eventually come back on them. Of course, the same political pressures and relationships with DOD and USAF might stifle competition for a possible“Y” contract.

joel hoffman said:

Yes,   Boeings LPTA lowball strategy to lock in the USAF for the follow on Tanker production orders may look brilliant. That may be a combination of the Boeing strategy, short sighted “limitations “ of the DoD and USAF and concerted political pressures. However, Boeing’s “less than stellar” (putting it mildly) cost, schedule, and quality performance might eventually come back on them. Of course, the same political pressures and relationships with DOD and USAF might stifle competition for a possible“Y” contract.

No. Disagree with you. Just look at how USAF converted the FPIF contract that was WAY beyond PTA into what seems to be a cost-type contract. Boeing has fallen behind schedule, experienced egregious cost growth, and had quality control issues. USAF doesn't care (or doesn't seem to). They're locked into Boeing now. You'd think they'd be sending cure notices, right? But no. They need that new tanker, whether it meets specs or not.

Just my opinion, of course. I have no inside knowledge whatsoever.

For an account of the relationship between Boeing's commercial aircraft business and its military aircraft business in the context of the tanker competition, see Sweitzer, The Boeing 767 Tanker Boondoggle: How the Corporate-Sales-Pitch Procurement Regime Lost Its Parent and the U.S. Economy International Billions, Penn State International Law Review, Oct 2004.

https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1628&context=psilr

here_2_help said:

No. Disagree with you. Just look at how USAF converted the FPIF contract that was WAY beyond PTA into what seems to be a cost-type contract. Boeing has fallen behind schedule, experienced egregious cost growth, and had quality control issues. USAF doesn't care (or doesn't seem to). They're locked into Boeing now. You'd think they'd be sending cure notices, right? But no. They need that new tanker, whether it meets specs or not.

Just my opinion, of course. I have no inside knowledge whatsoever.

You seem to have said what I said, though I was intentionally  softer on the government side (than I wanted to be). Boeing and it’s backers have played the game like a well tuned fiddle.

joel hoffman said:

Boeing and it’s backers have played the game like a well tuned fiddle.

No, they haven't! It's just that they haven't had a lot of competition in that market, and never will.

Vern Edwards said:

For an account of the relationship between Boeing's commercial aircraft business and its military aircraft business in the context of the tanker competition, see Sweitzer, The Boeing 767 Tanker Boondoggle: How the Corporate-Sales-Pitch Procurement Regime Lost Its Parent and the U.S. Economy International Billions, Penn State International Law Review, Oct 2004.

https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1628&context=psilr

Good article! It does explain how Boeing used (or tried to use) military sales to offset demand problems on the commercial side.

Today, though, I believe it serves more as a valuable historical retrospective than a critique of current events. Unfortunately, the article is focused on the failed leasing deal and not on the current aircraft procurement contract award. Its market analysis is similarly aged, in my view.

In the past couple of years, Boeing has had problems on both sides of the house. Big problems. Which is why it slashed the corporate dividend and saw its stock price fall precipitously. Between 2012 and 2020, though the company's stock price soared.

@here_2_helpI'm telling you: Read Flying Blind.

On 2/4/2022 at 9:36 AM, Vern Edwards said:

@here_2_helpI'm telling you: Read Flying Blind.

It arrived yesterday.

Good! It's quite a read, and provides background on commercial aircraft development, what happened to the values that made Boeing one of our greatest manufacturers, and the changes in its culture that brought it down. Prepare yourself to be sad and a little angry.

A close friend, very well known and respected, read the book at my suggestion and then wrote to me that it is a story of the decline of American capitalism.

A documentary on the 737 MAX tragedy is now available on Netflix. It’s called “Downfall: The Case Against Boeing”

Thank you Mathew.  I watched Downfall: The Case Against Boeing.  Boeing made a business decision.  Instead of building a new design, Boeing, like EUROplane, decided to modify an earlier platform.  

Read Air Current's Boeing's MCAS on the 737 Max may not have been needed at all.

Thanks , Bob. Very intriguing article along with additional links to related stories. Article discusses avoiding loss of market share, profit over safety concerns by engineers,  airline resistance $$$ and seller penalties for cross-training, additional simulator time, etc. and apparently some shame on SWA, too.

joel hoffman said:

Thanks , Bob. Very intriguing article along with additional links to related stories. Article discusses avoiding loss of market share, profit over safety concerns by engineers,  airline resistance $$$ and seller penalties for cross-training, additional simulator time, etc. and apparently some shame on SWA, too.

Don't let the FAA off the hook.

Vern Edwards said:

Don't let the FAA off the hook.

Agreed. The article also mentions the FAA, though not in much depth.

joel hoffman said:

Agreed. The article also mentions the FAA, though not in much depth.

Read Flying Blind. You cannot understand Boeing, the FAA, and the 737MAX unless you do. Read the Wall Street Journal review here: https://www.wsj.com/articles/flying-blind-review-downward-trajectory-11638136648

Boeing's "brilliant" financial strategy made some rich people a lot richer, damaged its reputation, cost its airline customers a lot of money, and killed 346 human beings.

I wonder if any of that has figured into their past performance evaluations, or will in the future.

Vern Edwards said:

Read Flying Blind. You cannot understand Boeing, the FAA, and the 737MAX unless you do.

Boeing's "brilliant" financial strategy made some rich people a lot richer, damaged its reputation, cost its airline customers a lot of money, and killed 346 human beings.

I wonder if any of that figures into their past performance evaluations.

I bought the book for my pilot son-in-law (including 737 MAX-9) and ex-USAF pilot daughter (C-130). I do intend to read it as soon as I can visit them. I read the preview and outline so far.

As for the PP evaluations, there are so many ex-military employees embedded at the Company and so much political support that I have little confidence in the probability of negative recent, relevant past performance evaluations.

There are around 500 max planes flying now.  To my knowledge, none crashed since they were allowed to fly again.  However, the damage is done in consumers' minds.

Boeing decided on development of a software program that took the controls of the Max out of the pilots' hands and sent the pilots--and passengers--on a series of 10-second roller coaster rides until the pilots were unable to compensate for the faulty progam and crashed into the ground at over 500 mph.  Boeing was at fault.  The FAA approved the MAX and MCAS as it was originally set up.  The FAA is at fault and someone needs to evaluate how FAA conducts tests.  No crash test dummies need apply.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency put the Max with the larger engines through its paces even without MCAS on and it was stable during the tests.

Boeing and FAA failed all of us because they gave Communist China the opportunity to be the first country to ground the Max after the two crashes.  They didn't enjoy that much, I'm sure.

On 2/19/2022 at 10:37 AM, Vern Edwards said:

Don't let the FAA off the hook.

This link in the cited article discusses the deception by Boeing and some of its employees (“scapegoats” ?) of the FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group FAA-AEG during the certification process and foot dragging  during the investigations subsequent to the grounding of the MAX fleet.

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/boeing-charged-737-max-fraud-conspiracy-and-agrees-pay-over-25-billion

It would be incredulous to believe that two Boeing technical pilots* independently schemed to deceive the FAA and Boeing’s customers about the differences between the 737 MAX and the 737-NG planes.

Of course, public reports and documents are not going to go into depth or detail about the extent or depth of the deception and problem, in deference to the long term business health of the company.

The extent of remedial actions as part of the deferred prosecution agreement, including reorganizing Boeing’s engineering function to have all Boeing engineers, as well as Boeing’s Flight Technical Team, report through Boeing’s chief engineer rather than to the business units, is telling…

Yes- I know there is much more complexity to the story, the Aviation and Airline competitive pressures and business climates, etc.

*Former lead technical pilot Mark A. Forkner was indicted last fall. The other pilot has apparently not been indicted, leading some to speculate that he cooperated in the investigation…

I am disappointed and embarrassed to say that Mark Forkner is a USAF Academy graduate. However, I am not surprised as there are a whole lot of Academy Graduates working in the Aviation and Space industry after retirement or service commitments.

What is particularly upsetting to me is that Honor (Honesty), Integrity, Ethics, Leadership and Character Development are Hallmark values of USAFA.

joel hoffman said:

Former lead technical pilot Mark A. Forkner was indicted last fall. The other pilot has apparently not been indicted, leading some to speculate that he cooperated in the investigation…

Here is Forkner's indictment: https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1442191/download

He sent an email to a colleague in which he said he lied to the FAA "unknowingly." Anyone who says such things in a company email deserves to be indicted, even if just for stupidity.

The problem is that he never told FAA what he knew about MCAS:

Quote

Despite knowing that MCAS could now operate at low speed and was no longer limited to high-speed, wind-up turns and speeds of Mach 0.7-0.8, FORKNER withheld this material fact from the FAA AEG.

On 2/18/2022 at 5:33 PM, Matthew Fleharty said:

A documentary on the 737 MAX tragedy is now available on Netflix. It’s called “Downfall: The Case Against Boeing”

Watched this over the weekend. Thanks for the recommendation.

The one problem I have with the criticism of Boeing and the FAA is that they are being judged on the result of their decision to not ground the 737 MAX. At the time of the decision, it may have been reasonable to believe that the risk of catastrophe was very low. Perhaps the probability of another crash within the time it would take to fix the problem was the same as a non-737 MAX crash. Yes, a second crash happened, but was it reasonable to believe that a second crash would happen based on the data available at the time?

Don Mansfield said:

Watched this over the weekend. Thanks for the recommendation.

The one problem I have with the criticism of Boeing and the FAA is that they are being judged on the result of their decision to not ground the 737 MAX. At the time of the decision, it may have been reasonable to believe that the risk of catastrophe was very low. Perhaps the probability of another crash within the time it would take to fix the problem was the same as a non-737 MAX crash. Yes, a second crash happened, but was it reasonable to believe that a second crash would happen based on the data available at the time?

If you read the indictment it sure looks like “yes”. The MCAS program software could engage at slow speeds - which it did in the simulation and actually did in both crashes. if a pilot wasn’t trained for that possibility and how to disengage the MCAS program or recover, there was probably a high probability of an incident. It is a different animal than  a 737- NG. According to the indictment, it appears that there was  NO training for the MCAS. 

I don’t know when the cause of the first crash was known and who knew though…

I admit I haven’t watched the documentary…

joel hoffman said:

If you read the indictment it sure looks like “yes”. The MCAS could engage at slow speeds - which it did in the simulation and actually did in both crashes. if a pilot wasn’t trained for that possibility and how to disengage the MCAS or recover, there was probably a high probability of an incident. It is a different animal than  a 737- NG. According to the indictment, it appears that there was  no training for the MCAS. 

I don’t know when the cause of the first crash was known and who knew though…

I admit I haven’t watched the documentary…

Yes, it would engage because of a sensor malfunction. What was the probability of a sensor malfunction? What was the probability of a crash in the case of a sensor malfunction?

Don Mansfield said:

The one problem I have with the criticism of Boeing and the FAA is that they are being judged on the result of their decision to not ground the 737 MAX. At the time of the decision, it may have been reasonable to believe that the risk of catastrophe was very low.

Bulls...!

It's not the presence of the MCAS that caused the problem. It was the failure of Boeing to put the FAA and pilots on notice about the MCAS and to require simulator training. They went out of their way not to put the FAA and pilots on notice and require simulator training. It was a business decision!!!!!!!!!  The need for simulator training would have affected sales and pricing.

The pilots of the crashed aircraft did not know what was happening to them. 

If you haven't read Flying Blind maybe you should.

Don Mansfield said:

Yes, it would engage because of a sensor malfunction. What was the probability of a sensor malfunction? What was the probability of a crash in the case of a sensor malfunction?

Methinks you must be kidding!!! Boeings engineers altered the application of MCAS to include lower speeds e.g.  takeoffs. Forkner wasn’t even initially aware of that and he was the lead technical pilot!!!  It was because the first flights of the new MAX showed rough handling characteristics  at low altitudes and speeds. The MCAS relied upon a single angle of attack sensor, which the Boeing engineers had previously expressed concern about as they were known to fail. If they did, the MCAS could aggressively and repeatedly force the nose down (into a dive)…!!!

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/boeings-fatal-flaw/transcript/

The MCAS software was apparently used earlier on an (unidentified) military tanker -possibly the KC-10 USAF tanker or the KC-135.

Don Mansfield said:

Watched this over the weekend. Thanks for the recommendation.

The one problem I have with the criticism of Boeing and the FAA is that they are being judged on the result of their decision to not ground the 737 MAX. At the time of the decision, it may have been reasonable to believe that the risk of catastrophe was very low. Perhaps the probability of another crash within the time it would take to fix the problem was the same as a non-737 MAX crash. Yes, a second crash happened, but was it reasonable to believe that a second crash would happen based on the data available at the time?

Glad you watched it! 😀 Though you must have taken a break at some key parts of the documentary because there is plenty of information in the documentary to show that there were fair process criticisms and not just results focused Monday morning quarterbacking. For instance, the FAA analysis after the first crash that estimated the 737 MAX would have 15 fatal crashes over it's life span or Boeing's own communications, both to the FAA which was outright deception ("jedi mind trick") and internally which showed that financials and absolutely no simulator training were the clear priorities over safety. There was enough information internally that leaders of Boeing were aware of that indicated a fair chance the aircraft might be responsible (single point of failure sensor, new software, no simulator training with only 10 seconds to respond...)

All that aside, what confirms in my mind that Boeing had a process problem (and not just a results issue) is that at no point, even after the second crash, did Boeing willingly ground their own airplanes. Instead, it still took governments around the world to stop the 737 MAX from flying until it was fixed/recertified. I have to believe that someone in the senior leadership at Boeing attended a top business school which routinely use the famous Tylenol recall case study; however, whoever it was must have slept through that lesson...Companies cannot purchase credibility, it has to be earned - and when it is lost, it can be difficult (if not impossible) to earn it back. More broadly, situations like this one only further erode trust in our society, it's tragic.

P.S. For anyone interested in another example see "Dopesick" (the series on Hulu - Michael Keaton puts on an excellent performance - and the book the show is based on) along with "Empire of Pain" which highlight a similar tragic tale about the opioid epidemic. In this case the regulators were both deceived and coopted (along with many doctors and patients). It helped me understand some of the vaccine hesitancy throughout the country, which is higher in communities that were/are impacted by the opioid epidemic.

This is from NPR.  It is from the author of Flying Blind and is about 36 minutes.

'Flying Blind' author says Boeing put profit ahead of safety.

bob7947 said:

This is from NPR.  It is from the author of Flying Blind and is about 36 minutes.

'Flying Blind' author says Boeing put profit ahead of safety.

Thanks, Bob. I can understand the Boeing predicament associated with the economics of the Seattle based union manufacturing workforce. I’m sure that their quality was unbeatable but must be very expensive.

It's a very good interview. But read Flying Blind.

Here we go again.  This time it is Air Force 1:

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/06/boeing-wants-more-money-new-air-force-one-usaf-official-says/368613/

Quote

The company has lost more than $5 billion on the KC-46.

And just think: Boeing filed a protest to win that contract.

On 6/27/2022 at 10:12 AM, Vern Edwards said:

And just think: Boeing filed a protest to win that contract.

And someone went to jail as well.   Let's not forget how this whole saga started.

How a mature commercial product married to a mature, proven technology/process (mid air refueling) could get so FUBAR'd is mind-boggling. The notion that Airbus was going to win such a large US military contract was absurd from the start and only got more absurd with every passing day. And now this.

Quote: “Already two years behind schedule, Boeing has lost $1.1 billion during the complicated process of converting a pair of passenger 747 airliners into a high-tech flying White House.” 
The contract’s original price was for about $ 3.8-4 Billion…